Showing posts with label religion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label religion. Show all posts

Sunday, February 1, 2009

Hugh J. Schonfield’s "The Passover Plot": Blaming the Victim

The rock face of Golgotha, the hill of skulls where Christ was crucified. See the eyes? Isn't it creepy?




Hugh J. Schonfield’s The Passover Plot: Blaming the Victim


Dr. Hugh J. Schonfield

Get set to be shocked. In the Sixties, Dr. Hugh J. Schonfield’s Bantam Books paperback edition of his bestseller The Passover Plot was, without question, the most famous book of popular Biblical scholarship at the time. As a teenager back then, I remember it was supposed to contain The Big Secret About Christianity that everyone was slavering for, and like everyone else, I was intensely curious about it.


The ossurary of Herod

As readers of my essay “The American Apocalypse” know, the two real Big Secrets about Christianity are that 1) John the Baptist, an Essene, was real founder of Christianity; he was Christ’s mentor, and therefore Christianity is really an Essene religion, and 2) St. Paul corrupted the young Jesus religion by injecting sexual guilt into it where none existed before, making the sins of the flesh more important than the sins of the spirit.


Imagine my surprise when I finally read The Passover Plot as a junior at Princeton in 1976—and learned that Schonfield was merely Mel Gibson in reverse. Read on and you’ll see.


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Hugh J. Schonfield’s The Passover Plot: Blaming the Victim



Albert Schweitzer remarked in The Quest for the Historical Jesus that nothing reveals a man so much as his interpretation of the life of Jesus. If it is true—and it probably is—then in his bestselling so-called "New Light on the History of Jesus," The Passover Plot, Dr. Hugh J. Schonfield certainly exposes the predilections of his personality, asserting that Jesus planned his own martyrdom deliberately with the help of his disciples.



Schonfield goes to great and unrealistic lengths to assert that a very few members of the Jewish leadership in Jerusalemthe Pharisees priesthood, particularly Caiphashad no role whatsoever in Christ’s death. While there’s no questions that the vicious Roman occupiers must bear the ultimate blame for Christ’s death, there’s also no question that certain members of the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem, terrified of their brutal occupiers, played some role in helping the Romans eliminate an innocent man that nearly everyone regarded as a dangerous heretic and a potential political revolutionary. You just didn’t go around saying, “I’m the King—yes, I’m more important than the Emperor—and by the way, I happen to be the Son of God too.” It would be like a radical today say, “Yeah, I’m the real President of the United States, so let's overthrow the government—and by the way, I’m God too.” From their points of view, both the Pharisees and the Romans were understandably shocked by Christ’s assertions. But that doesn’t excuse the murder of an innocent, peaceloving man.



Let me make it very clear: I am not endorsing the vicious medieval blood-libel canard of Mel Gilson and his ilk that “the Jews killed Jesus.” But it’s also an irrefutable historical fact that a tiny minority of the Jewish priesthood in Jerusalem played a minor administrative role in Christ’s death by handing him over to the Romans to placate the unforgiving foreign occupiers.


A contemporary depiction of Herod Agrippa

Herod, the ranting tyrant


No, the Jews most definitely didn't kill Jesus. But for God's sake, Mr. Schonfield, don't say Jesus had himself killed!


Schonfield declares, "We must never let theology entice us away from the historical circumstances, so that we lose contact with the factors which Jesus had to take into account." Yet through his avowed purpose, stated publicly before he deals with the facts, and through his selection of evidence, he quite clearly reveals his own prejudices. In the process he commits such grave errors of inobjectivity that he renders his own interpretation useless.


Giotto's Christ Before Caiaiphas (1304-6)

For one hundred and thirty pages, Schonfield hems and haws through the accumulation of evidence he attempts to build up to bolster his theory that Jesus, seized with a violent messianic complex, plotted his own martyrdom and carefully planned to insure his crucifixion in order to guarantee his place in history. Up until page 130, Schonfield maintains a veneer of reasonability; while much of his evidence is tangential, not to say circumstantial, and while much of his hypothesis is questionable, still, he does not rave like a zealot.


Then comes the bombshell. On page 130, he steps forward and exposes himself. What we see is a shock, and yet we must thank him for being so forthright. Otherwise we might mistake him for a serious Biblical scholar, if he did not unashamedly declare the rationale for his argument. His revelation is so astounding, and its implications so disturbing, that it deserves to be quoted in full here:

We have evidence that the chief priests at the time were arrogant and high-handed, loving wealth and power and position. This has been true of hierarchies of different lands at many periods. But in Palestine just now they were responsible in the difficult conditions of alien domination for the maintenance of public order, for assuring the continuity of national existence and the survival of the Temple as the world-centre of Jewish faith. Their present fears were by no means ill-founded, as Jewish history of the following decades abundantly confirmed. Better that one man should die than multitudes, including innocent women and children. The liquidation of individuals was commonplace in those days, and notorious during the closing years of the reign of Tiberius. It is still tolerated two thousand years later with all our vaunted concern for human rights. We must beware of judging what happened in light of what Christians believe about Jesus. We have to see him as he appeared to the Council in their grave predicament. From their point of view the decision they arrived at was fully justified, and Jesus, well knowing what he was doing, had quite deliberately forced them to take it by his skillfully planned and calculated activities. If he had not presented himself as a claimant of the throne of Israel and a menace to national security he would have been completely ignored by the Sanhedrin. He had himself made doubly sure that they would proceed to extremes against him by goading them with his words and behaviour, so that any possible mitigation of their severity would be offset by the personal animus he had intentionally created. The Council might imagine they were exercising their own free will in determining to destroy Jesus, and Judas Iscariot might believe the same in betraying him; but in fact the comprehensive engineer of the Passover Plot was Jesus himself. Their responses were governed by his ability to assess their reactions when he applied appropriate stimuli. Thus it was assured that the Scriptures would be fulfilled. (2) [Regarding spelling and punctuation, Schonfield is British.]


"I have frequently been urged by numerous readers to set down my convictions about Jesus," Schonfield informs us in his introduction. "They were persuaded that, in my unusual position as a Jew who has devoted a lifetime to the sympathetic elucidation of Christian Origins and is not connected with any section of the Church, I ought to have seen things which have escaped the observation of those more directly involved." (3) "Here Schonfield reveals the reason for his peculiar (to say the least) view of the Passion. It is understandable why he as a Jew would resent the blame Christians have placed on Jews for the Crucifixion as an excuse for anti-Semitism (when the scapegoating is only a transference of guilt felt by Christians for the death of Jesus). As Schonfield himself says:

The calumny that the Jewish people were responsible for the death of Jesus has all along been an antisemitic fraud perpetrated by the Church when it became paganised, and has been a direct cause of untold suffering and persecution inflicted on the Jews down the centuries. The present-day qualified second-thoughts of the Roman Church on the subject of Jewish 'deicide' has come very belatedly and is a totally inadequate retraction. (4)


Yet however understandable Schonfield's anger is, it is not excusable that he rationalize the murder of a being who, if nothing else, was a totally innocent man. What compounds Schonfield's crime is that he shows an awareness of the moral questions at stake and then he chooses to ignore them. He admits that "the liquidation of individuals" "is still tolerated two thousand years later with all our vaunted concern for human rights," and yet he refuses to apply that principle in the case of Jesus, because Jesus, as a holy man so obscure that our knowledge of him is almost totally limited to the adulatory writings of his disciples, posed a lethal threat to the integrity of the Jewish state.

A "battlefield Christ" scarecrow from the hellish trenches of World War One


Schonfield justifies Christ's execution in terms of his "menace to national security," through what even Schonfield admits was a kangaroo court. But by doing so, ironically enough, he is invoking the same brand of paranoid hysteria that drove George W. Bush to invade Iraq, murder a million innocent people, and torture countless others.


Critic Dwight MacDonald once wrote that a true liberal or a true conservative supports a cause that conforms to his principles even if it contradicts with his personal feelings. By seeking to rationalize the murder of an innocent man, Schonfield is revealing the lack of integrity of his principles. When he asserts of the Pharisees, "From their point of view the decision they arrived at was fully justified," he does not seem to realize that Hitler acted out of the same sincerity in slaughtering six million Jews; at the bottom of his heart he believed he was defending the West from a pernicious threat. The best Schonfield can do is parrot (unconsciously, I hope) Caiaphas: "Better that one man should die than multitudes, including innocent women and children." Or as Caiaphas said, "For the sake of the nation, Jesus must die."


To draw another contemporary example, it might be pleasant to shoot Osama Bin Laden in the head. I’m sure Bin Laden wouldn’t object, since he doesn’t seem to mind killing people very much. The only problem is, then you’re adopting the same principles as Bin Laden, that is, killing for peace, and then your action entirely justifies the suppositions of moral intellects like your homicidal murder victim. By acting in such a fashion, you cancel out your moral imperative. We only hope Schonfield will someday understand.


This is unfortunate, because he has some interesting things to say. Jesus is quoted as having made some remarks that are very much in keeping with Schonfield's theory, that he knew of his approaching martyrdom and death. The problem here is these remarks could have been added later by adherents who realized that if Jesus indeed had been omnipotent and all-knowing, then of course he must have foreseen his coming end.


Golgotha

In this matter, Schonfield is in a dilemma, although he doesn’t understand it, for he cannot bring himself to decide whether he accepts the veracity of the New Testament. He often contradicts himself, but here I will only provide two outstanding examples.


The tomb of Herod

Many times Schonfield relies heavily on the literal wording of the New Testament, taking them to recount the exact truth of what Jesus did, particularly when Jesus is making statements alluding to the coming end of his ministry; for instance, "My hour is not yet come," which Schonfield takes at face value. (6) Yet on the same page he lambasts two Biblical scholars who hold an orthodox view of the divinity of Jesus, because their view "transfers judgement to the New Testament, whose views reflecting subsequent Christian opinion we are invited to endorse as the truth." (7)


The ancient ossuary that was recently thought to be "the tomb of Jesus"

He readily admits that one must judge "allowing for the exaggeration in the Gospel tradition," (8) and of the Apostles he writes, "In their zeal they even amplified and supplemented the account of his experiences, as certain texts appeared to require additional incidents which could fulfill them." (9) Yet he never questions the incidents in the Gospels that support his convictions.


The garden tomb of Jesus

Why do the Gospel accounts of the Last Supper, with their explicit message that Jesus had foreknowledge of his betrayal, death, and resurrection, necessarily have to be true, when the Synoptic Apostles even have difficulty agreeing on which night this incredibly important event in their lives took place? Who says Jesus rose from the tomb and talked to them? Considering the large number of religious experiences and visions experienced by the disciples, why could Jesus' ghost not have been a hallucination, a wish-fulfillment, if not an outright lie?


The supposed tomb of Jesus


Schonfield does not bother to ask these questions; he dare not doubt the hypothesis he has erected; and as a result of his lack of intellectual integrity, a serious reader cannot even begin to take his position seriously. The only regret I have is that his facile interpretation has reached an extraordinary audience, even for a popular religious work, and I fear that too many uncritical readers will accept his views without thinking. Such shoddy thinking, in a matter of such importance to the West as the life and death of Jesus, has no excuse.


* * * * *

The brooding skull of Golgotha: notice how the eyes never leave you



NOTES


  1. Dr. Hugh J. Schonfield, The Passover Plot (New York, 1966), p. 93.
  2. Ibid., pp. 130-1.
  3. Ibid., p. 2.
  4. Ibid., p. 142.
  5. Ibid., pp. 142-5.
  6. Ibid., p. 37.
  7. Ibid.








BIBLIOGRAPHY


Schonfield, Dr. Hugh J. The Passover Plot. Bantam Books, New York, 1966.


A fascinating Maori Christ



AFTERWORD


In 1976, at the same time I originally wrote this academic paper, fascinatingly enough, the Israeli film company Golan-Globus released a film version of The Passover Plot, directed by Michael Campus and starring Zalman King as Yeshua (Jesus), Donald Pleasence as Pontius Pilate, Harry Andrews, Scott Wilson, Dan Hedaya, and Hugh Griffith. Because of heretical nature of the film, it was allegedly suppressed (or deliberately ignored), and today it’s available by download from the Internet.


Zalman King as Jesus in the film The Passover Plot (1976)


Incidentally, I originally wrote this essay as an academic paper for a Princeton Religion course on “The Origins of Christianity” while a junior in May 1976 for the esteemed religious scholar Dr. Phillip Ashby. He praised the paper, commenting: “Very insightful critical analysis of Schonfield.”


A coin of the Knights Templar


Saturday, January 3, 2009

Freud’s Totem and Taboo: The Psychological Roots of Religion, or Why God the Father Has To Murder God the Son

Warning: Not Safe For Work
Contains images of male and female nudity.




Freud by Andy Warhol


Mithra slaying the bull: the son murders the father


Freud’s Totem and Taboo: The Psychological Roots of Religion, or Why God the Father Has To Murder God the Son




Return with us now to the thrilling days of yesteryear, in the Dark Ages before Prozac, Xanax, Klonopkin and Wellbutrin, when psychologists asserted that man had a conscious mind and responsibility for his actions, entailing awareness and free will—back when people believed in Freud and thought man had a soul, rather than an easily-rearranged complex of neurotransmitters.



Now, of course, we’re enlightened (if a little disoriented). In his essay, “Sorry, But Your Soul Just Died,” Tom Wolfe discredited Freudianism, saying it was invalidated by the advent of lithium, which was able to cure manic-depressives instantly who had been resistant to psychoanalysis for years. A recent article, Researchers fight for psychotherapy's survival, highlights the current controversy going on in psychology and psychiatry.


The famous couch of dreams in Vienna


However, I’m an old-fashioned Puritan (as my first name, Wolcott, connotes), and I believe in free will. And as I argue in the essay that follows, I maintain that there are still mysteries of the human soul (and human culture) that cannot be explained, or alleviated, by psychopharmacology.



Freud’s Totem and Taboo: The Psychological Roots of Religion, or Why God the Father Has To Murder God the Son



Sigmund Freud wrote Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics to explain the psychological origins of religion. Considered one of the landmarks of twentieth-century intellectual history, it offers some of the most radical ideas ever offered in the study of religion. Freud asserts that belief in magic is based entirely on psychological principles. He echoes Sir James George Frazer, author of The Golden Bough: "men mistook the order of their ideas for the order of nature, and hence imagined that the control which they have, or seem to have, over their thoughts, permitted them to have a corresponding control over things" (see endnote 12).


The imaginary nameless fear that pursues us all


Freud goes on to argue that “we may venture to compare the various evolutionary stages of man's conception of the universe with the stages of the libidinous evolution of the individual….the animistic phase corresponds in time as well as in content with narcissism, the religious phase corresponds to that stage of object finding which is characterized by dependence on the parents, while the scientific stage has lists full counterpart in the individual's state of maturity where, having renounced the pleasure principle and having adapted himself to reality, he seeks his object in the outer world” (see endnote 18).



But perhaps his most radical analysis is saved for his interpretation of the Crucifixion, where he analyzes Christ’s death at the hands of his Father in Oedipal terms, followed by his contrast of Christianity with its major competitor, Mithraism, in terms of masochism and sadism.



In writing Totem and Taboo, Freud draws heavily on research done previously in anthropology, sociology, and history. To arrive at his theory, he formulates his interpretations of the above fields in light of his own personal school of psychoanalysis. Yet he admits the limitations of such an approach, while utilizing it.


The reader need not fear that psychoanalysis, which first revealed the regular over-determination of psychic acts and formulations, will be tempted to derive anything so complicated as religion from a single source. If it necessarily seeks, as it is duty bound, to gain recognition for one of the sources of this institution, it by no means claims exclusiveness for this source or even first rank among concurring factors. Only a synthesis from various fields of research can decide what relative importance in the genesis of religion is to be assigned to the mechanism which we are to discuss; but such a task exceeds the means as well as the intentions of the psychoanalyst. (1)



Despite this statement, Freud still believes that psychoanalysis can make a unique contribution to the study of religion. By purporting to solve many of the questions of the origin of religion in the course of his investigation, he suggests that perhaps only psychoanalysis can provide the answers to the problems of religion. In relation to his inquiry into the origin of incest-dread, he makes himself clear enough when he says, "Into this darkness psychoanalytic experience throws one single ray of light." (2)



The thrust of his study is this: the psyche, expressed through religious trappings, continues to influence man into the modern era. By investigating primitive cultures, we can trace these influences to their root. Conversely, we can understand the origins and significance of these influences by analyzing their manifestations in contemporary neurotics. Specifically he concentrates on pursuing the origins and significance of two taboos, those prohibiting murder and incest, which have remained to this day the two great antisocial crimes.


Paris Hilton and her sister playacting at mocking the taboo of incest


First Freud establishes the strength of taboo restrictions.



The taboo restrictions are different from religious or moral prohibitions. They are not traced to a commandment of a god, but really they themselves impose their own prohibitions; they are differentiated from moral prohibitions by failing to be included in a system which declares abstinences in general to be necessary and gives reasons for this necessity. The taboo prohibitions lack all justification and are of unknown origin. Though incomprehensible to us they are taken as a matter of course by those who are under their dominance. (3)



In psychological terms, from the above passage, taboos sound suspiciously like deep-seated repressions. Freud elaborates:


But the real sources of taboo lie deeper than in the interests of the privileged classes. "They begin where the most primitive and at the same time the most enduring human impulses have their origin, namely, in the fear of the effect of demonic powers." "The taboo, which originally was nothing more than the objectified fear of the demonic power thought to be concealed in the tabooed object, forbids the irritation of this power and demands the placation of the demon whenever the taboo has been knowingly or unknowingly violated." (4)



"As pointed out elsewhere, spirits and demons were nothing but the projection of primitive man's emotional impulses," Freud writes. (5)



After citing extensive anthropological data on primitive taboos, Freud articulates the basis of his argument:


He who approaches the problem of taboo from the field of psychoanalysis, which is concerned with the study of the unconscious part of the individual's psychic life, needs but a moment's reflection to realize that these phenomena are by no means foreign to him. He knows people who have individually created such taboo prohibitions for themselves, which they follow as strictly as savages observe the taboos common to their tribe or society. If he were not accustomed to call these individuals "compulsive neurotics" he would find the term "taboo disease" quite appropriate for their malady. Psychoanalytic investigation has taught him the clinical etiology and the essential part of the psychological mechanism of this compulsion disease, so that he cannot resist applying what he has learnt there to explain corresponding manifestations in folk psychology.


Famed self-proclaimed neurotic Woody Allen, who evidently had a problem meeting girls


There is one warning to which we shall have to give heed in making this attempt. The similarity between taboo and compulsion disease may be purely superficial holding good only for the manifestations of both without extending into deeper characteristics. Nature loves to use identical forms in the most widely different biological connections as, for instance, for coral stems and plants and even for certain crystals or for the formation of certain chemical precipitates. Assuredly would it be both premature and unprofitable to base conclusions relating to inner relationships upon the correspondence of merely mechanical conditions. We shall bear this warning in mind without, however, giving up our intended comparison on account of the possibility of such confusions. (6)


The brilliant Oscar Levant made a career out of his neurosis in the Fifties


Freud cites some very convincing evidence. Savages fear that taboos can be transferred by touching (the contagion theory).



This transferability of the taboo reflects what is found in the neurosis, namely, the constant tendency of the unconscious Impulse to become displaced through associative channels upon new objects. Our attention is thus drawn to the fact that the dangerous magic power of the mana [a spirit, an impersonal force residing in people, animals, and inanimate objects] corresponds two real faculties, the capacity of reminding man of his forbidden wishes, and the apparently more important one of temping him to violate the prohibition in the service of these wishes. Both functions reunite into one; however, if we assume it to be in accord with a primitive psychic life that with the awakening of a memory of a forbidden action there should also be combined the awakening of a tendency to carry out the action. Memory and temptation then again coincide. We must also admit that if the example of a person who has violated a prohibition leads another to a same action, the disobedience of the prohibition has been transmitted like a contagion, just as the taboo is transferred from a person to an object, and from this to another. (7)



In a subsequent passage, Freud discusses mourning guilt among savages and their death wishes directed toward their peers. While his peers are living, the savage bears an ambivalent attitude toward them; he both loves and hates them.



The taboo of the dead also originates from the opposition between the conscious grief and the unconscious satisfaction at death. If this is the origin of the resentment of spirits [feared by the primitive man] it is self-evident that just the nearest and formerly most beloved survivors have to fear it the most. (8)


Freud compares this ambivalence to the love-hate relationships that we all bear to those we know, but which are exaggerated in neurotics.



By assuming a similar high degree of ambivalence in the emotional life of primitive races such as psychoanalysis ascribes to persons suffering from compulsion neurosis, it becomes comprehensible that the same kind of reaction against the hostility latent in the unconscious behind the obsessive reproaches of the neurotic should also be necessary here after the painful loss had occurred. (9)


Oedipus on stage: gouging his eyes out is, of course, symbolic castration

A modern-dress staging of Oedipus Rex


In anticipation of his critics, Freud states:


We are probably not mistaken in assuming that such attempted explanations expose us to the reproach of attributing a most impossible delicacy of psychic activities to contemporary savages. But I think that we may easily make the same mistake with the psychology of these races who have remained at the animistic stage that we made with the psychic life or the child, which we adults understood no better and whose richness and fineness of feeling we have therefore so greatly undervalued. (10)



With this, in my opinion, Freud has established a very strong connection between the savage's dread of taboo and modern compulsion neurosis. It is the internal similarity, not the external, that makes the most overpowering evidence. But Freud does not say they are completely identical. He points out their paths of divergence:



Primitive races fear a punishment for the violation of a taboo, usually a serious disease or death. This punishment threatens only him who has been guilty of the violation. It is different with the compulsion neurosis. If the patient wants to do something that is forbidden to him he does not fear punishment for himself, but for another person. The person is usually indefinite, but, by means of analysis, is easily recognized as some one very near and dear to the patient. The neurotic therefore acts as if he were altruistic, while primitive man seems egotistical. (11)



Then Freud investigates the psychological basis for belief in magic. He comes to the startling, but entirely reasonable, conclusion that belief in magic is based entirely on psychological principles.



We can see how true Tylor's quoted characteristic of magic: "mistaking an ideal connection for a real one," proves to be. The same may be said for Frazer's idea, who has expressed it almost the same terms: "men mistook the order of their ideas for the order of nature, and hence imagined that the control which they have, or seem to have, over their thoughts, permitted them to have a corresponding control over things." (12)



As a consequence, for the savage, "In the animistic age the reflection of the inner world must obscure that other picture of the world which we believe we recognize." (13) "We are therefore prepared to find that primitive man transferred the structural relations of his own psyche to the outer world, and on the other hand we may make the attempt to transfer back into the human soul what animism teaches about the nature of things." (14) This reversal of approaches shows, if nothing else, does how much man has changed intellectually, though not emotionally.



By the same token, neurotics base their fears on the same psychological formulations as savages.



Thus the omnipotence of thought, the over-estimation of psychic processes as opposed to reality, proves to be of unlimited effect in the neurotic's affective life and in all that emanates from it.... But through this attitude as well as through the superstition which plays an active part in his life, he reveals to us how close he stands to the savage, who believes he can change the outer world by a mere thought of his.



The primary obsessive actions of the neurotic are really altogether of a magical nature. If not magic they are at least anti-magic and are destined to ward off the expectation of evil with which the neurosis is wont to begin. (15)



When this formulation is extended into the study of religion, Freud produces some fascinating ideas. Sacrifices are made to gods with the expectation that certain wishes will be fulfilled.



It would also seem as if it were the magic act itself which compels the fulfillment of the wish by virtue of its similarity to the object desired. At the stage of animistic thinking there is as yet no way or demonstrating objectively the true state of affairs, but this becomes possible at later stages when, though such procedures are still practiced, the psychic phenomenon of skepticism already manifests itself as a tendency to repression. At that stage men will acknowledge that the conjuration of spirits avails nothing unless accompanied by belief, and that the magic effect of prayer fails if there is no piety behind it. (16)



If we accept the evolution of man's conceptions of the universe mentioned above, according to which the animistic phase is succeeded by the religious, and this in turn by the scientific, we have no difficulty in following the fortunes of the "omnipotence of thought" through all these phases. In the animistic phase, man ascribes omnipotence to himself; in the religious he has ceded it to the gods, but without seriously giving it up, for he reserves to himself the right to control the gods by influencing them in some way or other in the interests of his wishes. In the scientific he has acknowledged his smallness and has submitted to death as to all other natural necessities in a spirit of resignation. Nevertheless, in our reliance upon the power of the human spirit which copes with the laws of reality, there still lives on a fragment of this primitive belief in the omnipotence of thought. (17)



Taking this idea one step further, Freud compares the three world views with the three successive stages of growth in the individual.



If we may take the now established omnipotence of thought among primitive races as a proof of their narcissism, we may venture to compare the various evolutionary stages of man's conception of the universe with the stages of the libidinous evolution of the individual. We find that the animistic phase corresponds in time as well as in content with narcissism, the religious phase corresponds to that stage of object finding which is characterized by dependence on the parents, while the scientific stage has lists full counterpart in the individual's state of maturity where, having renounced the pleasure principle and having adapted himself to reality, he seeks his object in the outer world. (18)


As a side note, Freud makes another comparison.


In one way the neuroses show a striking and far-reaching correspondence with the great social productions of art, religion, and philosophy, while again they seem like distortions of them. We may say that hysteria is a caricature of an artistic creation, a compulsion neurosis, a caricature of a religion, and a paranoiac delusion a caricature of a philosophical system. (19)



In what he attempts to be his masterstroke, Freud tries to explain the historical origin of taboo restrictions, and so of modern neuroses, with the construct of the slaying of the fathers by the rebellious, sexually frustrated younger males of the prehistoric primal horde (the Neolithic clan). Recent findings have disclosed that no such primal horde ever existed in human or prehuman society, so that shoots the hell out of Freud's theory; besides, his defense of racial memory (20) is not a little dubious. Yet it is not surprising that Freud should take such tact, considering that he states openly, at the end of his book:


In closing this study, which has been carried out in extremely condensed form, I want to state the conclusion that the beginnings of religion, ethics, society and art meet in the Oedipus complex. This is in entire accord with the findings of psychoanalysis, namely, that the nucleus of all neuroses as far as our present knowledge of them goes is the Oedipus complex. (21)


What about my mother?


This statement fits in with Freud's theory that all neuroses have a sexual root. Subsequent psychologists, such as Jung and Carl Rogers in On Becoming a Person, have found this to be false in their treatment of neurotic patients.


A striking graphic for a production of Oedipus


However, just because the prehistoric cause of neurosis that Freud was groping for—to prove has pet theory, admittedly—has been discredited, it is no reason that the rest of his researches, based on sound reasoning and concrete facts, should be discarded. The bulk of his ideas on religion do not have the primal horde theory as their base. In fact, little of his research connected with religion is grounded on the Oedipus complex, and even some of those are of alarming significance. For instance, he cites various case studies where he was involved in which the subjects exhibited a clear Oedipus complex. He goes on to say:


In view of these observations we consider ourselves justified in substituting the father for the totem animal in the male's formula of totemism. We then notice that in doing so we have taken no new or especially daring step. For primitive men say it themselves and, as far as the totemic system is still in effect today, the totem is called ancestor and primal father. We have only taken literally an expression of these races which ethnologists did not know what to do with and were therefore inclined to put in the background. Psychoanalysis warns us, on the contrary, to emphasize the very point and to connect it with the attempt to explain totemism.



The first result of our substitution is very remarkable. If the totem animal is the father, then the two main commandments of totemism, the two taboo rules which constitute its nucleus—not to kill the totem animal and not to use a woman belonging to the same totem for sexual purposes—agree in content with the two crimes of Oedipus, who slew his father and took his mother to wife, and also with the child's two primal wishes whose insufficient repression or whose re-awakening forms the nucleus of perhaps all neuroses. (22)



When viewed in this light, Freud's interpretation of the Crucifixion is particularly arresting—and illuminating.


In the Christian myth man's original sin is undoubtedly an offence against God the Father, and if Christ redeems mankind from the weight of original sin by sacrificing his own life, he forces us to the conclusion that this sin was murder. According to the law of retaliation which is deeply rooted in human feeling, a murder can be atoned only by the sacrifice of another life; the self-sacrifice points to blood-guilt. And if this sacrifice of one's own life brings about a reconciliation with god, the father, then the crime which must be expiated can only have been the murder of the father.



Thus, in the Christian doctrine mankind unreservedly acknowledges the guilty deed of primordial times because it now has found the most complete expiation for this deed in the sacrificial death of the son. The reconciliation with the father is the more thorough because simultaneously with this sacrifice there follows the complete renunciation of woman, for whose sake mankind rebelled against the father. But now also the psychological fatality of ambivalence demands its rights. In the same deed which offers the greatest possible expiation to the father, the son also attains the goal of his wishes against the father. He becomes a god himself beside or rather in place of his father. The religion of the son succeeds the religion of the father. As a sign of this substitution the old totem feast is revived again in the form of communion in which the band of brothers now eats the flesh and blood of the son and no longer that of the father, the sons thereby identifying themselves with him and becoming holy themselves. Thus through the ages we see the identity of the totem feast with the animal sacrifice, the theanthropic [both human and divine] human sacrifice, and the Christian eucharist, and in all these solemn occasions we recognize the after-effects of that crime which so oppressed men but of which they must have been so proud. At bottom, however, the Christian communion is a new setting aside of the father, a repetition of the crime that must be expiated. We see how well justified is Frazer’s dictum that "the Christian communion has absorbed within itself a sacrament which is doubtless far older than Christianity." (23)


The symbolic value of the above interpretation is not to be ignored. If we excise the remarks about the primal horde, the passage makes perfect sense. What would I replace the remarks about the primal horde with? In their place I would simply put the Oedipus complex, the fact that on an unconscious level every child is sexually attracted to the parent of his or her opposite sex, that parent being its first encounter with, and its model of, the opposite sex.




There is really no need for a slain primal father. There is no reason that the patricidal impulse had to be carried out; it is simply one that surfaces in every generation of humankind. And the frustration of that impulse is not the cause of every neurosis—it is merely one cause, perhaps the cause of most of the neuroses that Freud encountered; perhaps that is why he identified it as the sole origin. Like every great theorist, Freud went overboard; just because his excesses are easily identifiable is no reason to ignore the body of his lifework.


Freud goes on to offer a theory that is dazzling in its brilliance. He reminds us that early Christianity’s chief rival was Mithraism, the religion of Roman soldiers throughout the Empire. Now Mithraism was a religion of soldiers, of men without women. It was an unashamedly homosexual religion. In fact, women were so detested in Mithraism that mothers in childbirth were bound to trees in the hopes they would die in labor. That’s how dirty women were regarded by Mithraism.


Christianity lifted many aspects from Mithraism. Mithra was born on December 25. His birth was greeted my three Magi (Zoroastrian astrologers). Mithraism has seven sacraments.



But as Freud points out, the key myth of Mithraism is Mithra slaying the Bull. The Son slays the Father, whereas in Christianity, in the Crucifixion, the Father slays the Son. Just as Mithraism is sadistic, a religion of violent soldiers, Christianity is masochistic, a religion for woman and slaves. (Christianity triumphed in large part because it was the only religion in the ancient world at that time that accepted woman and slaves as adherents.)



"Saturn Devouring One of His Children" by Goya: Father Chronos gets hungry


The implication of Freud’s insight is staggering, and puts Christianity in an entirely new psychological and cultural light.


Without a doubt, in my mind, Totem and Taboo is a work of genius. As an integrated piece of work, is amazing. He begins the book by defining his terms and laying the basis of his argument; once the groundwork is established, he proceeds to cite strong evidence to state his case; then he sets forth his theory, making each point carefully and building on each preceding point.



As I read the book, he startled me constantly with the brilliance of his thought; some of the ideas that struck me the most I have reproduced here. Although taking an amazingly radical viewpoint, he makes a great deal of sense because of the way he presents his ideas. While his book is not the solely definitive approach to the study of religion—no approach is—his contribution delivers astonishing insights that are available nowhere else and that change completely the way we look at religion.

* * * * *


FOOTNOTES


  1. Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo," The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud (New York, 1965), p. 884.

  1. Ibid., p. 904.

  1. Ibid., p. 821.

  1. Ibid., p. 825-6.

  1. Ibid., p. 878.

  1. Ibid., p. 827.

  1. Ibid., p. 833.

  1. Ibid., p. 855.

  1. Ibid., p. 854.

  1. Ibid., p. 883.

  1. Ibid., p. 862.

  1. Ibid., p. 871.

  1. Ibid., p. 873.

  1. Ibid., p. 877.

  1. Ibid., p. 874.

  1. Ibid., p. 872.

  1. Ibid., p. 875.

  1. Ibid., p. 876-7.

  1. Ibid., p. 863-4.

  1. Ibid., p. 927-8.

  1. Ibid., p. 926-7.

  1. Ibid., p. 908.

  1. Ibid., p. 924-5.





BIBLIOGRAPHY


Freud, Sigmund. The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud. Modern Library: New York. 1965.



Note: I wrote an earlier version of this essay while a sophomore at Princeton in May 1975 as Religion paper.